In this paper we argue that two important causes of welfare losses in oligopolistic markets have been neglected. We show that in models where location is endogenous, welfare losses arising from wrong locations or from lack of market coverage may be substantial despite firms competing in prices. In contrast, welfare losses arising from quality choice are modest but they might vary discontinuously with the size of the market.
Introduction
An important issue in Industrial Organization is the study of the ine¢ ciencies yielded by imperfect competition. In a pathbreaking contribution, Harberger (1954) provided a quantitative estimate of these ine¢ ciencies by computing the "Harberger triangle" for a number of US manufacturing industries. Later studies disputed the …ndings of Harberger. In particular, several authors pointed out other sources of welfare losses, such as lack of cost minimization (Leibenstein 1966) or the expenses of acquiring/maintaining market power (Tullock 1967 ). 1 In this paper we aim to contribute to this line of thinking. We will argue that several crucial determinants of welfare losses have been neglected and others may have been overstated. To substantiate our point, we study welfare losses in models of horizontal di¤erentiation (Hotelling 1929, d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979 , Economides 1984 and Salop 1979 ) and vertical di¤erentiation Thisse 1979, 1980 , and Sutton 1982, 1983) . In these models, location and market coverage (variables that are absent in the literature) play a paramount role in the determination of welfare losses. And Lerner's degree of monopoly (and thus, Harberger triangle) does not play any role determining welfare losses. Let us see why.
Section 2 considers the Hotelling model. Like Harberger (1954) , we consider the percentage of welfare losses (P W L) de…ned as the percentage at which equilibrium welfare falls short of the optimum. We …rst study how P W L depends on the basic parameters that de…ne the market such as the reservation price, transportation cost and marginal costs. We …nd that P W L depends on these magnitudes in a non-monotonic way. The reason is that a change in these magnitudes not only changes welfare for given locations but also causes …rms to reallocate. Next, we study if P W L can be recovered from observable variables such as prices, marginal costs, location and the percentage of market coverage. We …nd that, in most cases, P W L can be calculated from location and market coverage alone. P W L decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered, in which case P W L is constant) and with the distance from the market edges as it goes to the optimal location. Prices, marginal costs 1 See Cowling and Mueller (1978, p. 728 ) for a summary of the criticism of Harberger's approach.
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(and thus markups) and demand elasticities do not help to …nd P W L: 2 Finally, P W L might be large despite price competition. This shows that misallocation arising from the wrong location and lack of market cover could be very signi…cant. 3 Section 3 considers a model of a circular city (Salop 1979) . Here P W L depends on the magnitudes mentioned in the Hotelling case and also on the number of …rms and the form of the transportation cost, which in Hotelling was quadratic and here is either linear or quadratic. As in the Hotelling model, P W L decreases with the market coverage, unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered, in which case P W L is constant. Here, P W L can be calculated in all cases. In other words, the indeterminacy that occurred in the Hotelling model does not arise here. As in the Hotelling model and for the same reason, P W L is independent of demand elasticities and markups. Also, since here there are no misallocations due to …rms being in the wrong locations, P W L tends to be smaller than in the Hotelling model. But these losses may be large, up to 25%. Finally, P W L is not monotonic in the transportation cost for given market coverage. The reason is that a change in this magnitude changes welfare both in equilibrium and in the optimal allocations.
In Section 4 we study vertical (quality) di¤erentiation , 1980 and Shaked and Sutton 1982 , 1983 . We assume that the parameter that measures the taste for quality is uniformly distributed across the population of consumers, assumed to be in a closed interval. Here we have two kinds of equilibria: those in which the whole market is covered and those in which not all the market is covered. 4 We …nd that P W L is a discontinuous function of the length of the interval mentioned above with a maximum of about 8:33%. The discontinuity is caused by the fact that there is a point in which a low-quality …rm freezes the quality of its good and does not serve consumers with very low taste for quality. This discontinuity arises at the point at 2 For the role of markups and demand elasticities in models with exogenous location and quality choice see Corchón and Zudenkova (2009) . 3 It can be argued that lack of market coverage cannot occur once entry is allowed in the model.
The di¢ culty is that the Hotelling model becomes intractable with more than two …rms so that, at this stage, it is di¢ cult to gauge the importance of this criticism. 4 We remark that, given a vector of parameters de…ning a market, equilibrium is unique. Thus, we cannot have the two classes of equilibria mentioned above simultaneously in the same market.
3 which the market becomes uncovered. Welfare losses can be computed from relative prices and the degree of market coverage. 5 When the whole market is covered, P W L is single-peaked in relative prices reaching a maximum at an interior point. Thus an increase in relative prices can decrease or increase relative welfare losses. When not all the market is covered, P W L depends only on market coverage, in a decreasing way, as expected.
Finally, Section 5 sums up our …ndings.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper dealing with the issues tackled in this paper, namely Fan (2010) . She studies mergers in the U.S. Daily Newspaper
Market considering …xed location. She …nds that ignoring adjustments in quality causes substantial di¤erences in estimated e¤ects of mergers. Apart from our common emphasis on variables other than prices and quantities, our studies are di¤erent. She focuses on welfare e¤ects of mergers and we focus on the di¤erence between optimal and equilibrium welfare. She focuses on quality and considers location …xed. Moreover, she does not consider the welfare impact of market coverage.
Summing up, our paper provides a theoretical study of welfare losses produced by oligopoly when location or quality is endogenous. Our study suggests that variables that have been overlooked in most empirical studies and the regulation literature might play a very important role. A shortcoming of our study is that it relies on assumptions that are unlikely to be met in actual markets like duopoly and symmetry. But if these assumptions are removed, computations are extremely complex and the models become unworkable. Thus, our paper is better understood as a pointer on the role of certain variables rather than a ready-to-use guide on the role of these variables in actual markets.
Horizontal Di¤erentiation: The Hotelling Model
There are two …rms producing a di¤erentiated good. Consumers purchase either one unit or none of the di¤erentiated good according to preferences, prices and the distribution of the two brands in product space. Brands are located in the interval [0; 1]. Each consumer has a most-preferred brand speci…cation . Consumers are uniformly distributed along 5 As in the Hotelling model, we do not consider entry in the vertical di¤erentiation model.
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[0; 1] with density 1. A brand located at point x i , i = 1; 2, is valued for the consumer at point according to U (x i ; ) = d where stands for the reservation price, d = jx i j is the Euclidean distance between x i and , and measure the importance of transportation costs, and and are positive. The decision rule of consumer is:
purchase one unit of brand
, where p i is the price of brand
The marginal cost of production is c < .
The model where = 1 is not easily tractable since pro…t functions are discontinuous and nonconcave. 6 To overcome these di¢ culties we assume that = 2. Summing up: and a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium exists. 8 We consider three symmetric equilibrium con…gurations: local monopolistic equilibrium, kinked equilibrium and competitive equilibrium. 9 We characterize equilibria where consumers at the edges of the market buy the di¤erentiated good. 10 6 For further details see d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Economides (1984) . 7 "Linear" relates to the linear form of the product space. "Horizontal" refers to the form of product di¤erentiation. In Section 4 we will speak of a "Linear Vertical" market in which product di¤erentiation is vertical. 8 Salop (1979) used the term "kinked" for an equilibrium where the markets just touch and there is no tangency of demand. Economides (1984) used the term "touching" for such an equilibrium. 1 0 Economides (1984) studied the case of a "not-too-high" reservation price where consumers at the edges of the market prefer not to purchase the di¤erentiated good. He showed that under linear transportation cost function the equilibrium of the locations game is a local monopolistic one. The reason is that in the "competitive region" …rms have incentives to relocate marginally away from each other and reach the "kinked" region. While in the "kinked" region …rms still want to relocate away from each other and reach the "local monopolistic" region.
Local monopolistic equilibrium. At this equilibrium, some consumers lying between two …rms do not purchase the di¤erentiated good, so the market is not fully covered.
Each …rm charges monopoly price p m . A consumer with preferred brand 2 x 1 ; 1 2 is indi¤erent between purchasing from …rm 1 and not purchasing the di¤erentiated good
In the second stage …rm 1's pro…t maximization with respect to p m yields
Plugging p m (x 1 ) into …rm 1's pro…t yields
After tedious calculations one …nds that Kinked equilibrium. At a kinked equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer with preferred brand speci…cation = 1 2 is indi¤erent between purchasing from …rm 1 or from …rm 2 at price p k and not purchasing the di¤erentiated good if
At the same time, …rms still enjoy local monopolistic power, therefore p k (x 1 ) = p m (x 1 ), which yields
In the kinked equilibrium …rms behave as local monopolists but maintain full market coverage so x 1 > 0 or c < there is a kinked equilibrium with fx 1 ; x 2 g = f0; 1g and p k = 4 , which is an intermediate case between the kinked equilibrium described above and the competitive equilibrium, which is analyzed below. 
A Kinked Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f ; ; cg with
4 is a price p k = 4 and brand locations fx k1 ; x k2 g = f0; 1g.
Competitive equilibrium. A consumer with preferred brand speci…cation 2 (
is indi¤erent between purchasing brand x 1 and purchasing brand x 2 if
so the demands D 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ) and D 2 (p 1 ; p 2 ) faced by …rms 1 and 2 read
Firm i's pro…t maximization with respect to p i yields
and corresponding pro…ts become
The "marginal relocation tendency of …rms" reads 4 is a price p c = c + and a list of brand locations fx c1 ; x c2 g = f0; 1g.
Thus, the equilibrium con…guration depends on the values taken by c .
-For low values of c (i.e. c < 5 16 ), there exists a local monopolistic symmetric equilibrium where the …rms enjoy monopolistic power at the market edges while consumers in the center of the market do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity. The higher the value of c , the closer …rm 1 (resp. …rm 2) to location . In this equilibrium …rms enjoy all the monopolistic power: they sell to consumers both at the market edges and in the market center, and still do not become involved in competition with one another.
-If
there is a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered, …rms do not compete for the market center consumers (the markets just touch) but do not extract all the possible surplus from the market edges consumers: the consumers at the edges of the market get positive surplus by purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity.
-If there exists a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered, …rms are situated at the edges of the market fx k1 ; x k2 g = f0; 1g and do not compete for the market center consumer (the markets just touch).
-Finally, for high values of c (i.e. ) there is a competitive equilibrium where the entire market is covered, the …rms are situated at the edges of the market fx c1 ; x c2 g = f0; 1g and compete for the market center consumers.
De…ne social welfare W as the gross consumers'surplus minus costs (i.e., the mar-ginal cost and the consumers'transportation costs):
which is equal in equilibrium to Note that the social welfare does not depend on the equilibrium price, which is just a transfer from the consumers to the producers. In our framework the social welfare is only a¤ected by the market coverage and …rms'locations, which determine the consumers' transportation costs and the consumers'surplus net of marginal cost. This is the reason why the social welfare in a kinked equilibrium for . Indeed, in both cases the whole market is covered and the …rms are located at the market edges.
A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost and the …rms' locations to maximize the social welfare. One can check that the social welfare in the optimum, denoted by W o , is equal to
where the …rst line corresponds to the case where not all the market is covered and consumers at the market center do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity; the second line corresponds to the case where the entire market is covered and the …rms are and is equal to (2.1)
The reason is that a change in c not only changes welfare for given locations but it causes reallocation e¤ects that may overcome the latter e¤ect. For instance, a decrease in transportation costs makes the economy more competitive, but at the same time causes …rms to relocate away from each other, increasing monopoly power.
-For c < 1 16 P W L is constant. In this case the market is not covered either in equilibrium or in the optimum. Welfare losses are due to the …rms' monopolistic behavior.
-For
c . In this case in equilibrium the market is not covered, while in the optimum it should be covered. Indeed, with an increase of c the equilibrium con…guration gets closer to the optimum con…guration
16 P W L = 0 since equilibrium con…guration is the same as the optimum one: the whole market is covered and the …rms are located at
In this case the higher c is, the closer the …rms locate to the edges of the market (so the higher the consumers' transportation costs are). This e¤ect exacerbates welfare losses.
-Finally, when
Here in equilibrium, the …rms locate at the market edges and compete for the consumers located at the market center.
Thus, P W L is decreasing in c .
So far we have analyzed the relationship between P W L and the parameters de…ning a linear horizontal market f ; ; cg. Let us now relate P W L with observable variables.
An Observation is a tuple fp; c; x; mg of market price p, marginal cost c (p > c), the relative distance from the market edges to brand locations x 2 0; 
1 2x into the third line of (2.1) yields the third line of (2.2) for P W L as a function of observables. It is straightforward to check that the linear horizontal market f ; ; cg yields a kinked equilibrium where p k = p and fx k1 ; x k2 g = f0; 1g. From the fourth line of (2.1) we get PWL in the kinked equilibrium, denoted as P W L k , as a function of observables and :
which is increasing in and achieves its maximal value of to hold) and let = p c. It is easy to show that the linear horizontal market f ; ; cg yields a competitive equilibrium where p c = p and fx c1 ; x c2 g = f0; 1g. From the fourth line of (2.1) we get P W L in the competitive equilibrium, denoted as P W L c , as a function Firstly, P W L can be calculated from location and market coverage in three out of four cases in (2.2). Only in the case where the whole market is covered and the …rms locate at the market edges, i.e. m = 1 and x = 0, could P W L be any number between zero and 3 35 , even if price and marginal cost are observed. 11 Knowledge of demand elasticity, denoted by ", cannot be used to break the indeterminacy of P W L.
In the case of a kinked equilibrium, the demand function is not di¤erentiable so demand elasticity is not well de…ned. In the case of a competitive equilibrium, from the …rst order condition of pro…t maximization " = p p c , so knowledge of " is redundant. The same argument applies if the cross elasticity of demand
, denoted by , is observable since in our model, in equilibrium, = ". 12 Secondly, P W L is independent of demand elasticities (own and cross) and markups. This is explained by the fact that as demand is totally inelastic, a high price, unless it induces not buying the good, does not cause welfare losses. As we remarked before, an increase in price just redistributes the surplus between consumers and …rms. This makes a di¤erence with models in which consumers may buy several goods where demand elasticities and markups can be used to …nd P W L even though their impact is sometimes 
Horizontal Di¤erentiation: The Salop Model
Consider the economy described in the previous section with the following changes.
Firstly, the product space of the monopolistically competitive industry is a circle with a perimeter equal to 1. Secondly, there are n brands of the di¤erentiated good available at prices p 1 ; :::; p n . As before, each …rm is allowed to produce just one brand. Thirdly, …rms do not choose their brand location, but are automatically located equidistant from one another on the circle. 13 This simpli…cation allows this model to be solved for linear ( = 1) and quadratic ( = 2) transportation costs. Summing up:
De…nition 5. A Circular Market is a list f ; ; c; n; g, where ; ; c 2 R + , 2 f1; 2g; n 2 N, and > c.
where D i is the demand …rm i faces and p i is the price chosen by …rm i. As before, we consider three symmetric equilibrium con…gura-tions: local monopolistic equilibrium, kinked equilibrium and competitive equilibrium.
Local monopolistic equilibrium. At the local monopolistic equilibrium, some consumers lying between two neighboring …rms do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity, so the market is not covered. Each …rm charges monopoly price p m . A consumer with preferred brand speci…cation located at the distance 2 0; As before, the equilibrium con…guration depends on the underlying parameters.
When c and n are small, the market is small (either because the reservation price and/or the number of …rms are small or because marginal costs and/or transportation costs are large) and local monopolies arise. 14 For intermediate values of Social welfare, W , de…ned as before is
which in the equilibrium reads for = 1; 2
Notice that, again, the social welfare does not depend on the equilibrium price, which is just a transfer from the consumers to the producers. In our framework the social welfare is only a¤ected by the market coverage, which determines the consumers'transportation costs and the consumers'surplus net of marginal cost.
A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost, which a¤ects the market coverage and, therefore, the consumers'transportation costs and the consumers' surplus net of marginal cost. It is straightforward to show that the social welfare in the optimum, denoted by W o , reads
where the …rst (resp. second) line corresponds to the case where not all the market (resp. the whole market) is covered in the optimum and = 1; 2. The percentage of welfare losses, de…ned as before, equals We now study the relationship between the observable variables and P W L. As before, we assume that market price, outputs, marginal costs, number of active …rms and can be observed (in the Hotelling model we assumed that = 2). Our view is that re ‡ects, basically, the technology of transportation and that this technology is common knowledge.
Formally, let fp; x; c; n; g be an Observation, where p (> c) stands for market price,
x is quantity sold by each …rm, which is de…ned as a proportion of consumers purchasing from each …rm, c is marginal cost, n 2 N is the number of active …rms and 2f1; 2g is the transportation costs. Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Given an observation fp; x; c; n; g there is a Circular Market f ; ; c; n; g such that fp; xg is a Local Monopolistic Equilibrium for this market when not all the market is covered, i.e. when xn < 1, and P W L is given by
Proof : When x < Finally, Figure 3 .2 shows that P W L is not monotonic in for given market coverage.
The reason is that a change in changes welfare both in equilibrium and in the optimal allocations.
Entry can be considered in this framework by assuming that each …rm incurs a …xed cost of entry, K. 15 In this case P W L is a (non-monotonic) function of
be very large, up to 50%. Given an observation, there is a Circular Market with free entry such that the observation is an equilibrium for this market, and P W L 2 0; 1 2 . Thus, the introduction of …xed costs makes it impossible to infer welfare losses from observations. As before, knowledge of the demand elasticity or the cross elasticity of demand adds nothing. All these results agree with those obtained in Corchón (2008) for the case of Cournot equilibrium with free entry and product homogeneity.
Vertical Di¤erentiation
In this section we study oligopolistic competition under quality di¤erentiation. This model was developed by Thisse (1979, 1980) and Sutton (1982, 1983) . We consider the simpli…ed version of Shaked and Sutton (1982) . Again we have a two-stage game in which in the …rst stage …rms compete in quality (one per …rm) and in the second stage they compete in prices. Consumers'preferences are described by U = ts p if the consumer purchases one unit of quality s at price p, and by 0 otherwise. The parameter t of taste for quality is uniformly distributed across the population of consumers, t U [a; b] with 0 < a < b.
The density is Consider price competition. Consumers with high taste for quality buy the highquality good and consumers with lower taste for quality buy the low-quality good (which must be priced lower to attract any consumer), while consumers with the lowest taste for quality might not purchase at all. A consumer with taste parameter t 1 is indi¤erent between purchasing from …rm 1 and not purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity if and only if t 1 s 1 p 1 = 0, so t 1 = . Therefore, the demand functions read
Each …rm i maximizes its pro…t i = p i D i (p i ; p j ) with respect to p i . We consider two possible cases in turn: where the market is not covered (i.e. t 1 > a) and where the market is covered (i.e. t 1 a).
Case where the market is not covered. The condition t 1 > a amounts to 0 < s 1 < b 4a b a s 2 for b 4a. Case where the market is covered. When t 1 a, the market is covered and the consumer with the lowest taste parameter weakly prefers to purchase product 1. Firms' pro…t maximization yields
where b > 2a (for both …rms compete for consumers). Then pro…ts read
Thus, the high-quality …rm charges a higher price than the low-quality producer. It also makes a higher pro…t. For the whole market to be covered in equilibrium, the consumer with taste parameter a should weakly prefer a low-quality good to nothing, the entire market is covered, and the consumer with the lowest taste parameter a is indi¤erent between buying the low quality product and neither product. The larger the market, the higher the quality of good 1. The reason is that price competition between two goods drives their prices down to a level at which not even the consumer with the lowest taste for quality would want to buy good 1 if its quality is very low. So to attract consumers, …rm 1 has to raise the quality of its good. At some point however-at b a = 8 exactly-…rm 1 prefers to freeze the quality at constant level s 1 = 4 7 S and not to serve consumers with low taste parameters such that the market becomes uncovered. Thus, the discontinuity arises at the point in which the market becomes uncovered. De…ne social welfare, denoted by W , as the gross consumers'surplus:
which in the equilibrium reads
(5a 3 5a 2 b+2ab 2 +3b 3 )
A social planner would choose the brands'quality to maximize the social welfare, thus
Hence, in the optimal allocation there are two undi¤erentiated …rms that make no pro…t, and the social welfare reads
Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses reads is an equilibrium for this market, and
ii) Given an observation fp 1 ; p 2 ; mg where 7 8 < m < 1, and
, there is a linear vertical market fa; b; Sg such that 
which yields
It is straightforward to check that 2 < into the …rst line of (4.1) we get (4.2) for P W L as a function of an observation fp 1 ; p 2 ; mg.
Second, consider the case where the market is not covered, . Here P W L depends only on the market coverage, in a decreasing way, as expected.
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied welfare losses in models of horizontal (i.e. location) and vertical (i.e. quality) di¤erentiation. Here is a summary of our main results. 1. In location models, despite price competition, welfare losses can be very large, larger than under monopoly with similar demand but no location choice, the latter being 25%. 16 Except in a single case, welfare losses can be inferred from observables. Welfare losses are due to lack of market cover and to …rms located in the wrong positions. Markups and demand elasticities do not play any role in determining welfare losses in these models. They might play a role if consumers were allowed to buy several goods.
2. Under vertical di¤erentiation welfare losses can be read from prices and market coverage but they are discontinuous with the size of the market. The percentage of welfare losses here is not very large. Thus, despite the apparent similarities in the derivation of equilibrium in models of horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, these two models are very di¤erent from the point of view of welfare losses.
The main conclusion of our paper is that the emphasis in empirical studies of oligopolistic welfare losses and the theory of regulation on prices or outputs might be a little misguided. Our analysis of horizontal di¤erentiation models suggests that variables like location or market coverage play a relevant role. In contrast, there is some work on quality regulation (see Armstrong and Sappington 2005 for an excellent survey of regulation) but our analysis suggests that welfare losses arising from such an item in oligopolistic markets might be not very large.
Several extensions of our work are worth mentioning. The models considered in this paper are symmetric, assume two …rms only (except in the case of the Salop model) and rely on speci…c forms of the commodity space. We hope that our methods can be used to study models with asymmetric …rms, see e.g. Aghion and Schankerman (2004) for a Salop model with heterogeneous costs or with other forms of the commodity space such as the Spokes model, Chen and Riordan (2007) . Another possible extension of our work would be to study consumer and producer surpluses separately and see the e¤ects of location and market coverage on each variable.
